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The Explosion of Specialized Criminal Courts: An Introduction 
With aspirations of reducing reliance on incarceration, specialized criminal courts proliferated 
widely over the past two decades. There are approximately 3,000 specialized criminal courts in 
the United States, including drug courts, mental health courts, veterans courts, and reentry courts. 
These courts arose as a judicially-innovated attempt to devise anti-formalist alternatives to 
traditional probation, jail and prison for particular categories of defendants: drug addicts, 
mentally ill persons, and veterans, among others. The courts’ enduring popularity is due largely 
to their promise to rationalize and humanize criminal sentencing and lower levels of 
imprisonment, all while protecting public safety and reducing crime. But it remains unclear what 
these courts actually portend. How should we understand the vast expansion of specialized 
criminal courts? Do these courts, as some critics charge, improve judges’ experience of criminal 
law administration without meaningfully addressing the social or legal problems they aim to 
tackle? Or might specialized criminal courts bring about more fundamental, transformative 
change through their beneath-the-radar rethinking of the ultimate purposes of criminal law? 
My recent Article, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law,
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reveals that specialized criminal courts have become critical terrain for a contest between at least 
four competing criminal law reformist models. And, different outcomes in this contest may 
portend starkly different futures for U.S. criminal law and governance. 
In contrast to the existing scholarly commentary on specialized criminal courts, which is largely 
trapped in the mode of advocacy—alternately celebratory or disparaging, and insufficiently 
attentive to the remarkable variation between different specialized criminal courts—my Article 
introduces an analytic framework and critical theoretical account of four contending criminal law 
reformist models at work in specialized criminal courts. These four criminal law reformist 
models include: 
(1) a therapeutic jurisprudence model, 
(2) a judicial monitoring model, 
(3) an order maintenance model, and 
(4) a decarceration model. 
Based on a multi-method approach consisting of site visits, and an analysis of archived 
interviews, the courts’ promotional materials, ongoing empirical monitoring of the courts, and 
the legal academic and sociological literature on the courts, I demonstrate how specialized 
criminal courts, adopting features associated with what I call a decarceration model, may enable 
significant transformative change in U.S. criminal law. But if configured primarily in accord 
with the first three models above, these courts threaten to produce a set of undesirable 
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outcomes—expanding criminal surveillance and possibly even increasing incarceration—despite 
opposite intended effects. 
This analytic framework serves to illuminate the remarkable and underappreciated variation 
between different specialized criminal courts in ways that should inform both future study of the 
courts and institutional design. In certain configurations, these courts—and the reformist models 
they reflect—hold the potential to produce a range of harmful results, even if they improve job 
satisfaction for judges. But adopting different legal institutional and conceptual arrangements, 
specialized criminal courts promise to reduce incarceration, shifting resources and attention from 
criminal law administration to other sectors. The broader ambition of my Article is to suggest 
that a decarceration model offers not simply a preferable manner of conceptualizing specialized 
criminal courts, but a normative framework for criminal law reform more generally. 
These four models each consist of a combination of legal institutional and ideological features. 
Multiple models may overlap in one court. For example, a mental health court may have both a 
therapeutic orientation and rely heavily on judicial monitoring, but the models constitute basic 
ideal types—bundles of institutional and ideological features—to which existing courts roughly 
correspond. Although these models operate predominantly in the specialized courts context, they 
have broader potential applicability. Specialized criminal courts function effectively as grounds 
for testing reformist possibilities that may be implemented on a larger scale elsewhere. 
 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Judges as Therapists, and Specialized Criminal Courts 
On the first prominent model of specialized criminal court, a therapeutic jurisprudence model, 
the judge refers individual defendants to psychotherapy and attempts to engage therapeutically 
with defendants in court in accord with what is referred to in the legal academic literature as 
“therapeutic jurisprudence.” A therapeutic model aims to make court proceedings themselves, in 
the criminal law context and more broadly, part of a therapeutic process. 
There are several potential problems with the therapeutic model. First, this approach is 
questionable even if one concedes court processes should be directed to advancing therapeutic 
outcomes, because it is particularly unclear how a lay-therapist judge’s interaction with a 
criminal defendant in a criminal court can be reliably therapeutic even if we would want it to be. 
A separate institutional problem arises when police and prosecutors understand the court as part 
of a therapeutic process. This creates a risk of net-widening, that is, that more cases will come to 
the criminal court for therapy, because institutional actors see the prosecutorial process as 
therapeutic, even in cases that would otherwise be dropped or referred directly to social services. 
Additionally, locating therapy within a criminal court presents a risk that the therapeutically 
oriented but relatively untrained judge will engage in so-called “therapeutic interventions” that 
are excessively punitive, with punishment trafficking under the guise of therapy, and profoundly 
distorting both. 
One particularly colorful and disturbing example of this latter problem may be found in Judge 
Amanda Williams’ Glynn County Georgia Drug Court, which pronounced until it was disbanded 
“indefinite” therapeutic jail sentences for violations of technical conditions such as abstinence 
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from drugs or alcohol or petty criminal offenses. For infractions as minor as a first offense of 
forging two of her father’s checks totaling 100 dollars, one young woman was sentenced to ten 
and a half years under criminal supervision: five and one half years in the Glynn County Drug 
Court, including fourteen months behind bars, and then an additional six months locked up, 
followed by four and one half years on probation.
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This young woman, Lindsay Dills, entered the Glynn County Drug Court, missed a curfew, and 
failed a drug screen. As a consequence, without further ado, she spent seven days in jail. Dills 
reported that Drug Court Judge Amanda Williams “would flip out every time [Dills] went before 
her. . . . [S]he was just . . . screaming . . . in court. . . . [S]he’s standing behind the bench, with a 
microphone and screaming . . . .”3 For subsequent technical violations, such as a missed curfew 
or dirty urine tests, Dills reported spending 51 days, 90 days, and 104 days incarcerated, until 
Judge Williams sent Dills away on an “indefinite sentence.” In Dills’ own words: 
So I get to the jail house and I call my dad immediately . . . from the pay phone that’s in 
the booking area. And I hear the phone ring . . . where the booking area is. And they 
answer it and I heard them say, “Dills.” . . . So I’m on the phone and they said, “Dills 
hang that phone up.” And I’m like, “OK.” [S]o I turn around and the[y] tell me that Judge 
Williams has now called and ordered me to have no further contact: no phone, no 
visitation and no mail. And that I’d be put in their isolation cell. And I’m like, “How 
long?” [T]hey’re like, “We don’t know.” And I’m like, “Well for the whole 28 days that 
I’m here?” And they said, “Well your order is now indefinite.” 
. . . . 
. . . I cried a lot. . . .I was like, “How is this happening? How is this ethical? . . . Have I 
killed someone that I don’t know about?” . . . But there’s nothing I can do about it. 
Because I can’t even use the phone. I can’t even send a letter.4 
Dills reportedly came to the attention of the jail authorities when she attempted suicide, after 
weeks in isolation, by cutting open her wrists.
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Although the National Association of Drug Court Professionals discourages such a punitive 
approach, the malleability of therapeutic jurisprudence when administered by lay-therapist 
judges makes it all too likely that judges will confuse therapy with punishment and that their 
unchecked retributive impulses will be brought to bear under the guise of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. Such potential miscarriages of therapeutic jurisprudence expose another 
significant overlooked feature of specialized criminal courts operating on a therapeutic model. 
Therapeutic courts attempt to rid themselves of the various traditional approaches to criminal 
punishment—retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation—in favor of a therapeutic approach. 
Although conventional criminal courts generally (at least in principle) administer criminal law 
with self-conscious reference to a compound of retributive, deterrent, and other punishment 
approaches, specialized criminal courts adopting a therapeutic cast seek to purify the 
administration of criminal law to one putatively rehabilitative “therapeutic” variant. The risk of 
this attempted purification is that it is difficult to disentangle deterrent, therapeutic, and 
retributive impulses in criminal punishment, and so cordoning off certain courts as purely 
involved in therapeutic interventions may both misstate what is actually occurring in those courts 
and undermine judicial self-consciousness about whether the punitive effects of particular 
4 
 
decisions are proportional to the offending conduct and no greater than necessary to deter 
offending behavior. 
Even if the Glynn County court is an extreme example, the result of judicial overreaching in 
therapeutic courts threatens to recur. This is due to the immense discretionary authority wielded 
by lay-therapist judges; because of the courts’ lack of institutional therapeutic competence, 
transparency and procedural regularity; and because when these judges’ retributive impulses, 
which may be inherent in criminal proceedings, operate under the rubric of therapy, there is 
likely to be inadequate attention to proportionality that in principle constrains punishment on a 
retributive approach. 
And even if the problem of disproportionate punitiveness might in principle be resolved by 
having all specialized criminal courts adopt sentencing ceilings for technical violations, courts 
operating on a therapeutic model embrace an anti-formalist, problem-oriented, discretionary 
approach that rejects such externally imposed, pre-fixed constraints. This model, when it comes 
to predominate over other approaches to criminal law administration, thus promises to place 
judges with extraordinary power in a position where they act in what they perceive to be 
defendants’ therapeutic interests but with unchecked, potentially punitive effects, unimpeded by 
principles of proportionality characteristic of a retributive theory of punishment. According to 
Judge Williams, who resigned last month in response to a wide-ranging ethics investigation into 
her drug court: “I didn’t just decide I was going to be mean to these people. It’s all treatment 
motivated.”6 This is all the more troubling because these judges often lack formal 
psychotherapeutic expertise and many are likely exhausted by the undoubtedly difficult work of 
dealing with criminally accused addicted or mentally ill individuals, most frequently in under-
resourced environments. The relaxation of procedural safeguards as part of an anti-formalist, 
team-based, therapeutic approach only stands to exacerbate these problems if judges are not 
particularly conscientious. With no overriding commitment to avoid incarceration (in fact some 
have argued incarceration may be therapeutic), the results may well be more incarceration or at 
least more expansive criminal supervision, not less. 
 
Judicial Monitoring, Judges as Probation Officers, and Specialized Criminal Courts 
A second dominant criminal law reformist model at work in specialized criminal courts is the 
judicial monitoring model. On this model, the court initially assigns a non-prison or jail-based 
sentence but mandates reporting back to the judge on a regular basis to determine compliance 
with technical conditions of release. The judge effectively functions as a probation or parole 
officer. The theoretical basis of this model is a judicially-focused deterrence theory, severed 
from any therapeutic ends. 
Judicial monitoring also presents a number of risks involving judicial overreaching, expanded 
surveillance, and increased incarceration for technical violations. Sociologist James Nolan’s 
account of the Syracuse Drug Court illustrates some of these problems concretely.
7
 Nolan reports 
how on one occasion, to maintain a defendant’s employment in a case in which employment was 
a condition of supervised release, the Syracuse drug court judge cross-deputized a defendant’s 
employer to report any tardiness or other problems at work to the court. In response, the judge 
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promised to have the defendant arrested and taken to jail. Accordingly, as with the therapeutic 
model, the role of the judge expands dramatically. Process decreases. The focus purely on 
judicially-orchestrated deterrence threatens to blind the judicial monitor to concerns about 
proportionality or justice. There is no overriding commitment to avoid incarceration. Thus, 
increased periods of at least short-term incarceration threaten to follow and the reach of the 
criminal law threatens to radically expand. 
 
Order Maintenance, Judges as Beat Cops, and Specialized Criminal Courts 
An order maintenance model, the third criminal law reformist model at work in specialized 
criminal courts and explored in the Article, is represented most prominently in community 
courts. Community courts address primarily low-level quality of life offenses. An order 
maintenance approach draws on the broken windows theory of policing or the order maintenance 
hypothesis, according to which, addressing minor disorder will prevent more serious crime, and 
hence reduce criminal arrests and incarceration overall.
8
 However, regardless of the long-term 
effects of order maintenance prosecutions, in the meantime, courts adopting this model widen the 
net of offenses targeted by criminal courts in a manner distinct from therapeutic courts or judicial 
monitoring bodies, by focusing on relatively minor offenses that would not otherwise be 
prosecuted. Disorderly conduct prosecutions are common-place in order maintenance courts for 
pedicab drivers’ obstruction of cross-walks or unlicensed vending of t-shirts or otherwise licit 
goods.
9
 And indeed, empirical analyses establish that increased case filings and increased 
incarceration for less serious offenses are the unintended outcomes of at least certain courts 




Decarceration, Judges as Monitors of Diversion, and Specialized Criminal Courts 
A decarceration model, by contrast, is committed foremost to reducing incarceration and to a 
sociologically-informed and empirically-monitored framework that seeks to link court 
participants to other social sectors, such as mental and public health provision, employment, and 
housing. The goal is to reduce conventional jail and prison-based sentencing and also to shift to 
more comprehensive, holistic, sociologically and empirically attuned means of protecting public 
safety and preventing crime. Courts reflecting a decarceration model are minimalist institutions 
and are primarily diversionary. They shift the order-maintaining function of criminal sentencing 
from criminal courts—where surveillance occurs on the therapeutic, judicial monitoring or order 
maintenance models—,to other social sectors where order is maintained less formally. The courts 
then function as monitors of the diversionary service providers, relying in part on ongoing 
empirical feedback regarding the results of diversionary assignments. But judges are not 
involved in day-to-day monitoring of defendants. For example, the Harlem Reentry court, upon 
recognizing the incarceration-increasing outcomes associated with court monitoring, shifted 
predominantly to a decarceration approach, working to locate individual employment 
opportunities throughout the East Harlem corridor, raising funds for treatment and residential 
programs, and intervening only to increase the intrusiveness of an individual’s criminal 
supervisory regime if there is recurrent noncompliance that threatens public safety.
11
 The 
programs to which participants are sentenced are available to all community residents, not just 
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court participants. Court staff then monitors the service providers in a manner akin to monitoring 
in the structural litigation context. Courts that have experimented with this model handle, in at 
least some jurisdictions, those charged with or convicted of serious felony offenses. This is 
critical to reducing incarceration, because many misdemeanor offenders already receive 
minimally invasive probation in conventional courts or are not otherwise pursued. Importantly, 
this approach accords with sociological and criminological scholarship suggesting that informal 
surveillance and integration into social institutions—employment, neighborhood organizations, 




Operating along these lines, a decarceration model may initiate a set of change processes in 
criminal law, by beginning to set in motion conceptual, institutional, and systemic shifts. 
Specialized criminal courts adopting a decarceration approach may begin to cognitively reframe 
how we think about particular categories of crime and punishment. Starting at the local level, 
these courts may advance a structural, collectivist, determinist, and public health framing of 
drug-related offending, offending on the part of persons with mental illness, veterans, and others. 
Empirical monitoring of the courts’ work—in particular of rates of recidivism of defendants 
processed in specialized courts adopting a decarceration approach as compared to defendants 
processed in conventional courts—may begin to break down more broadly the association in the 
public imagination between incarceration and public safety. Therefore, even though it is highly 
unlikely the courts will be sufficient in number to address a large portion of criminal case filings, 
they could begin to generate a transformative impact considerably beyond the relatively small 
number of cases handled. 
 
Conclusions and Objections 
Nonetheless, despite their potential to reframe how we understand crime, punishment and the 
necessity of incarceration for a wide range of cases and defendants, specialized criminal courts 
also pose a number of underappreciated risks: excessive legalism; a dilution of retributive and 
deterrent punishment; diminished due process; inefficient proliferating specializations; and 
legitimation of harshness in conventional courts and unfairness to those persons deemed less 
sympathetic than veterans or the mentally ill, but who are all things considered also deserving of 
greater lenience. The latter problem in particular is one that may have racially disproportionate 
effects. These are all difficult problems and I begin to deal with each in the Article. The general 
approach I take with respect to all, though, is that despite its limits a decarceration model does 
fairly well at warding off these concerns relative to other contending criminal law reformist 
models. On a decarceration model, sociologically-oriented experimentation permits 
incorporation of more robust procedural protections and navigation with empirical feedback of 
the risks identified on an ongoing basis. Further, these objections ought to be considered in 
reference not to some utopian alternative implicit though not explicit in the objection, but 
relative to the status quo in U.S. criminal law administration really at any point over the past 
century, and relative to reform proposals that have somewhat comparable plausibility as do 
specialized criminal courts. It is also important to note that these courts provide only a 
beginning, a preliminary manner of shifting understandings and resources to address the crises of 
overcriminalization and overincarceration. 
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Of course, in the end, it is possible that specialized criminal courts will be unable to successfully 
harness the decarceration strategies identified, and instead that the courts will expand 
surveillance and increase incarceration, privatize punishment, or legitimate harshness and 
unfairness. But given the severe problems at stake in U.S. criminal law, and the pressing 
challenges the courts aim to address, these strategies and a decarceration model more generally 
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